Ethical Views Of Ethics And Ethical Behavior - 1123 Words

Many different views and concepts related to ethics are discussed by Schermerhorn and Bachrach in this week’s lecture. As leaders and managers, a detailed understanding of these concepts is essential to providing appropriate leadership, guidance, and role-modeling to our employees, peers, and customers. Ethics and ethical behavior are especially important based on the scrutiny placed on leaders and managers in today’s world of increasing mass communication, social media, and enhanced transparency. Schermerhorn and Bachrach discuss four ethical views. These are the Utilitarian, Individualism, Moral-rights, and Communitive Justice views of ethics (Schermerhorn Bachrach, 2015). The Utilitarian view takes the position that†¦show more content†¦Leaders and managers do not deliberately make decisions to harm their organizations or profits. Sometimes the effects are unplanned and unforeseen. The Individualism view focuses on the concept that society as a whole will be better off if each individual strives to fulfill their own self-interests (Schermerhorn Bachrach, 2015). This view has the disadvantage of being focused on the individual rather than society as a whole. Although individual happiness and self-fulfillment are important, does society truly benefit from an individualistic view? In my opinion, this concept is open to basic human nature and the need for individuals to, when given the opportunity, focus only on themselves and the benefit they can gain. Unfortunately, this is a common theme in today’s society. In my work experience, I have frequently been exposed to individuals that have nothing in mind but focus on how the system can benefit them, with little regard for the greater organization. In most cases, I have ultimately witnessed these individuals and their intentions exposed either formally or informally. The Moral rights view of ethical behavior focuses on individuals and their basic rights (Schermerhorn B achrach, 2015). A disadvantage of the Moral rights view of ethical behavior is that this view is solely tied to maximizing the rights of theShow MoreRelatedEthics and Profits of an Organization843 Words   |  3 Pagesï » ¿Ethics and profits Introduction Any organization that is business oriented is in place to realize profits. Most of the corporations in the United States that are in existence were started on the basis of profit making. This means that the main reason why the corporations exist is so that the owners can get returns from their investment. Business ethics involves the application of ethics to business behavior and the decision making process in the business setting. The connection between businessRead MoreThe Integration Of Law And Ethics945 Words   |  4 Pagestitle indicates, Substantive ethics is about the integration of law and ethics in corporate ethics programs. The author of this article gives numerous examples of why integration of law and ethics is needed. There are numerous areas of concern, such as dishonest corporate dealings, global human rights, tort lawsuits, and questionable executive salaries (Blodgett, 2012). There is a view that laws are rules meant to be followed and not necessarily understood fo r its ethical value. This in turn is a majorRead MoreThe Leader s Ethical Values Influence Leadership Style Essay1658 Words   |  7 Pagesdiscovered that ethics and leadership style are correlated? The leaders come from various industries for instance, public, private, government, and non-profit/for-profit. The leader’s ethical values influence leadership style. The research suggests that the transformational leadership style is established on deontological ethics whereas transactional leadership is based on teleological ethics. 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Cooper BSHS/332 Professional, Ethical and Legal Issues in Human Services April 16, 2012 Kathleen Roberts Everyday individuals are faced with issues associated with ethical dilemmas. Ethical dilemmas involve an individual’s behavior toward a moral standard, which may have been established from previous generations and passed along. In upholding the standards taught individual may be forced to take a particular action involving a decision when a behavior is consideredRead MoreThe Ethics Of Business Ethics1471 Words   |  6 PagesNowadays, the concern for business ethics is growing rapidly in the business community around the world. Business ethics are focused on the judgment of decisions taken by managers and their behaviors. The issue regarding these judgments is the norms and cultures that shape these judgments. Business ethics are concerned about the issue, how will the issue be solved and how will it move ahead along the transition analysis as well (Carroll, 2014). Business ethics can be addressed at different levelsRead MoreEssay on Ethics: Where Do We Learn What Constitutes Right or Wrong?953 Words   |  4 PagesEthics: where do we learn what constitutes right or wrong? Under the three schools of ethical thought, Utilitarianism, Deontological and Virtue Ethics, you will find that there are varied and different views of how we come by our value systems and how we determine right and wrong. However, in all three of these schools of thought there is one underlying commonality: ethical relativism deems that a person’s values and judgments are based upon their cultural and societal influences and their personal

Against and for Capital Punishment Free Essays

string(103) " our suggestion is correct, it relates to many questions outside of the context of capital punishment\." SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. We will write a custom essay sample on Against and for Capital Punishment or any similar topic only for you Order Now 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? ACTS, OMISSIONS, AND LIFELIFE TRADEOFFS Cass R. Sunstein* and Adrian Vermeule** Many people believe that the death penalty should be abolished even if, as recent evidence seems to suggest, it has a significant deterrent effect. But if such an effect can be established, capital punishment requires a life-life tradeoff, and a serious commitment to the sanctity of human life may well compel, rather than forbid, that form of punishment. The familiar problems with capital punishment— potential error, irreversibility, arbitrariness, and racial skew—do not require abolition because the realm of homicide suffers from those same problems in even more acute form. Moral objections to the death penalty frequently depend on a sharp distinction between acts and omissions, but that distinction is misleading in this context because government is a special kind of moral agent. The widespread failure to appreciate the life-life tradeoffs potentially involved in capital punishment may depend in part on cognitive processes that fail to treat â€Å"statistical lives† with the seriousness that they deserve. The objection to the act/omission distinction, as applied to government, has implications for many questions in civil and criminal law. INTRODUCTION†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ 704 I. EVIDENCE †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. 10 II. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: MORAL FOUNDATIONS AND FOUR OBJECTIONS †¦ 716 A. Morality and Death†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 717 B. Acts and Omissions †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 719 1. Is the act/omission distinction coherent with respect to government?†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. 720 * Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, the University of Chicago Law School, Department of Political Science, and the College. ** Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, the University of Chicago. The authors thank Larry Alexander, Ron Allen, Richard Berk, Steven Calabresi, Jeffrey Fagan, Robert Hahn, Dan Kahan, Andy Koppelman, Richard Lempert, Steven Levitt, James Liebman, Daniel Markel, Frank Michelman, Tom Miles, Eric Posner, Richard Posner, Joanna Shepherd, William Stuntz, James Sullivan, and Eugene Volokh for helpful suggestions, and Blake Roberts for excellent research assistance and valuable comments. Thanks too to participants in a work-in-progress lunch at the University of Chicago Law School and a constitutional theory workshop at Northwestern University Law School. 703 SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 704 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 2. Is the act/omission distinction morally relevant to capital punishment? †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. 724 C. The Arbitrary and Discriminatory Realm of Homicide†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 728 D. Preferable Alternatives and the Principle of Strict Scrutiny†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ 32 E. Slippery Slopes †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ 734 F. Deontology and Consequential ism Again†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 737 III. COGNITION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ 740 A. Salience †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 741 B. Acts, Omissions, and Brains†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. 741 C. A Famous Argument that Might Be Taken as a Counterargument †¦.. 743 IV. IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE PROBLEMS †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ 744 A. Threshold Effects (? ) and Regional Variation †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ 745 B. International Variation †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 745 C. Offenders and Offenses †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 746 D. Life-Life Tradeoffs and Beyond†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 747 CONCLUSION †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚ ¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ 48 INTRODUCTION Many people believe that capital punishment is morally impermissible. In their view, executions are inherently cruel and barbaric. 1 Often they add that capital punishment is not, and cannot be, imposed in a way that adheres to the rule of law. 2 They contend that, as administered, capital punishment ensures the execution of (some) innocent people and also that it reflects arbitrariness, in the form of random or invidious infliction of the ultimate penalty. 3 Defenders of capital punishment can be separated into two different camps. Some are retributivists. 4 Following Immanuel Kant,5 they claim that for the most heinous forms of wrongdoing, the penalty of death is morally justified or perhaps even required. Other defenders of capital punishment are consequentialists and often also welfarists. 6 They contend that the deterrent 1. See, e. g. , Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 309, 371 (1972) (Marshall, J. , concurring). 2. See Stephen B. Bright, Why the United States Will Join the Rest of the World in Abandoning Capital Punishment, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? 52 (Hugo Adam Bedau Paul G. Cassell eds. , 2004) [hereinafter DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY]. 3. See, e. g. , James S. Liebman et al. , A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995 (Columbia Law Sch. , Pub. Law Research Paper No. 15, 2000) (on file with authors). 4. See, e. g. , Luis P. Pojman, Why the Death Penalty Is Morally Permissible, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 2, at 51, 55-58. 5. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 198 (W. Hastrie trans. , 1887) (1797). 6. Arguments along these lines can be found in Pojman, supra note 4, at 58-73. SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 705 effect of capital punishment is significant and that it justifies the infliction of the ultimate penalty. Consequentialist defenses of capital punishment, however, tend to assume that capital punishment is (merely) morally permissible, as opposed to being morally obligatory. Our goal here is to suggest that the debate over capital punishment is rooted in an unquestioned assumption and that the failure to question that assumption is a serious moral error. The assumption is that for governments, acts are morally different from omissions. We want to raise the possibility that an indefensible form of the act/omission distinction is crucial to some of the most prominent objections to capital punishment—and that defenders of capital punishment, apparently making the same distinction, have failed to notice that according to the logic of their theory, capital punishment is morally obligatory, not just permissible. We suggest, in other words, that on certain empirical assumptions, capital punishment may be morally required, not for retributive reasons, but rather to prevent the taking of innocent lives. 7 The suggestion bears not only on moral and political debates, but also on constitutional questions. In invalidating the death penalty for juveniles, for example, the Supreme Court did not seriously engage the possibility that capital punishment for juveniles may help to prevent the death of innocents, including juvenile innocents. And if our suggestion is correct, it relates to many questions outside of the context of capital punishment. You read "Against and for Capital Punishment" in category "Papers" If omissions by the state are often indistinguishable, in principle, from actions by the state, then a wide range of apparent failures to act—in the context not only of criminal and civil law, but of regulatory law as well—should be taken to raise serious moral and legal problems. Those who accept our arguments in favor of the death penalty may or may not welcome the implications for government action in general. In many situations, ranging from environmental quality to appropriations to highway safety to relief of poverty, our arguments suggest that in light of 7. In so saying, we are suggesting the possibility that states are obliged to maintain the death penalty option, not that they must inflict that penalty in every individual case of a specified sort; hence we are not attempting to enter into the debate over mandatory death sentences, as invalidated in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976). For relevant discussion, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 83 (1993). 8. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). Here is the heart of the Court’s discussion: As for deterrence, it is unclear whether the death penalty has a significant or even measurable deterrent effect on juveniles, as counsel for the petitioner acknowledged at oral argument. . . . [T]he absence of evidence of deterrent effect is of special concern because the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence. . . To the extent the juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person. Id. at 1196. These are speculations at best, and they do not engage with the empirical literature; of course, that literature does not dispose of the question whether juveniles are deterre d by the death penalty. SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 06 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 imaginable empirical findings, government is obliged to provide far more protection than it now does, and it should not be permitted to hide behind unhelpful distinctions between acts and omissions. The foundation for our argument is a significant body of recent evidence that capital punishment may well have a deterrent effect, possibly a quite powerful one. 9 A leading national study suggests that each execution prevents some eighteen murders, on average. 0 If the current evidence is even roughly correct—a question to which we shall return—then a refusal to impose capital punishment will effectively condemn numerous innocent people to death. States that choose life imprisonment, when they might choose capital punishment, are ensuring the deaths of a large number of innocent people. 11 On moral grounds, a choice that effectively condemns large number s of people to death seems objectionable to say the least. For those who are inclined to be skeptical of capital punishment for moral reasons—a group that includes one of the current authors—the task is to consider the possibility that the failure to impose capital punishment is, prima facie and all things considered, a serious moral wrong. Judgments of this sort are often taken to require a controversial commitment to a consequentialist view about the foundations of moral evaluation. One of our principal points, however, is that the choice between consequentialist and deontological approaches to morality is not crucial here. We suggest that, on certain empirical assumptions, theorists of both stripes might converge on the idea that capital punishment is morally obligatory. On 9. See, e. g. , Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al. , Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. L. ECON. REV. 344 (2003); H. Naci Mocan R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J. L. ECON. 453, 453 (2003); Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment’s Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 03 (2005) [hereinafter Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization]; Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays, and the Deterrence of Capital Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 308 (2004) [hereinafter Shepherd, Murders of Passion]; Paul R. Zimmerman, Estimates of the Deterrent Effect of Alternative Execution Methods in the United States, 65 AM. J. ECON. SOC. (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Alternative Execution Methods], available at http://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstract_id=355783; Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 63, 163 (2004) [hereinafter Zimmerman, State Executions]. 10. See Dezhbakhsh et al. , supra note 9, at 344. In what follows, we will speak of each execution saving eighteen lives in the United States, on average. We are, of course, suppressing many issues in that formulation, simply for expository convenience. For one thing, that statistic is a national average, as we emphasize in Part IV. For another thing, future research might find that capital punishment has diminishing returns: even if the first 100 executions deter 1800 murders, it does not follow that another 1000 executions will deter another 18,000 murders. We will take these and like qualifications as understood in the discussion that follows. 11. In recent years, the number of murders in the United States has fluctuated between 15,000 and 24,000. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl. 1 (2003), available at http://www. fbi. gov/ucr/03cius. htm. SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 707 consequentialist grounds, the death penalty seems morally obligatory if it is the only or most effective means of preventing significant numbers of murders; much of our discussion will explore this point. For this reason, consequentialists should have little difficulty with our arguments. For deontologists, a killing is a wrong under most circumstances, and its wrongness does not depend on its consequences or its effects on overall welfare. Many deontologists (of course not all) believe that capital punishment counts as a moral wrong. But in the abstract, any deontological injunction against the wrongful infliction of death turns out to be indeterminate on the moral status of capital punishment if the death is necessary to prevent significant numbers of killings. The unstated assumption animating much opposition to capital punishment among intuitive deontologists is that capital punishment counts as an â€Å"action† by the state, while the refusal to impose it counts as an â€Å"omission,† and that the two are altogether different from the moral point of view. A related way to put this point is to suggest that capital punishment counts as a â€Å"killing,† while the failure to impose capital punishment counts as no such thing and hence is far less problematic on moral grounds. We shall investigate these claims in some detail. But we doubt that the distinction between state actions and state omissions can bear the moral weight given to it by the critics of capital punishment. Whatever its value as a moral concept where individuals are concerned, the act/omission distinction misfires in the general setting of government regulation. If government policies fail to protect people against air pollution, occupational risks, terrorism, or racial discrimination, it is inadequate to put great moral weight on the idea that the failure to act is a mere â€Å"omission. No one believes that government can avoid responsibility to protect people against serious dangers—for example, by refusing to enforce regulatory statutes—simply by contending that such refusals are unproblematic omissions. 12 If state governments impose light penalties on offenders or treat certain offenses (say, domestic violence) as unworthy of attention, they should not be able to escape public retribution by contending that they are simply refusing to act. Where government is concerned, failures of protection, through refusals to punish and deter private misconduct, cannot be justified by pointing to the distinction between acts and omissions. It has even become common to speak of â€Å"risk-risk tradeoffs,† understood to arise when regulation of one risk (say, a risk associated with the use of DDT) gives rise to another risk (say, the spread of malaria, against which DDT has been effective). 13 Or suppose that an air pollutant creates adverse health effects 12. Indeed, agency inaction is frequently subject to judicial review. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157 (1996). 13. See generally RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham Jonathan Baert Wiener eds. , 1995) (considering â€Å"risk-risk tradeoffs† on topics such as DDT, the use of estrogen for menopause, and clozapine theory SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 708 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 ut also has health benefits, as appears to be the case for ground-level ozone. 14 It is implausible to say that, for moral reasons, social planners should refuse to take account of such tradeoffs; there is general agreement that whether a particular substance ought to be regulated depends on the overall effect of regulation on human well-being. As an empirical matter, criminal law is pervaded by its own risk-risk tradeoffs. When the deterrent signal works, a failure to impose stringent pe nalties on certain crimes will increase the number of those crimes. A refusal to impose such penalties is, for that reason, problematic from the moral point of view. It should not be possible for an official—a governor, for example—to attempt to escape political retribution for failing to prevent domestic violence or environmental degradation by claiming that he is simply â€Å"failing to act. † The very idea of â€Å"equal protection of the laws,† in its oldest and most literal sense, attests to the importance of enforcing the criminal and civil law so as to safeguard the potential victims of private violence. 5 What we are suggesting is that to the extent that capital punishment saves more lives than it extinguishes, the death penalty produces a risk-risk tradeoff of its own—indeed, what we will call a life-life tradeoff. Of course, the presence of a life-life tradeoff does not resolve the capital punishment debate. By itself, the act of execution may be a wrong, in a way that cannot be said of an act of imposing civil or criminal penalties for, say, environmental degradation. But the existence of life-life tradeoffs raises the possibility that for those who oppose killing, a rejection of capital punishment is not necessarily mandated. On the contrary, it may well be morally compelled. At the very least, those who object to capital punishment, and who do so in the name of protecting life, must come to terms with the possibility that the failure to inflict capital punishment will fail to protect life—and must, in our view, justify their position in ways that do not rely on question-begging claims about the distinction between state actions and state omissions, or between killing and letting die. We begin, in Part I, with the facts. Raising doubts about widely held beliefs based on older studies or partial information, recent studies suggest that capital punishment may well save lives. One leading study finds that as a national average, each execution deters some eighteen murders. Our question whether capital punishment is morally obligatory is motivated by these findings; our central concern is that foregoing any given execution may be equivalent to condemning some unidentified people to a premature and violent death. Of course, social science can always be disputed in this contentious domain, and spirited attacks have been made on the recent studies;16 hence, we mean to for schizophrenia). 14. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F. 3d 1027, 1051-53 (D. C. Cir. 1999). 15. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997). 16. See Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Deja SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 709 outline, rather than to defend, the relevant evidence here. But we think that to make progress on the moral issues, it is productive and even necessary to take those findings as given and consider their significance. Those who would like to abolish capital punishment, and who find the social science unconvincing, might find it useful to ask whether they would maintain their commitment to abolition if they were firmly persuaded that capital punishment does have a strong deterrent effect. We ask such people to suspend their empirical doubts in order to investigate the moral issues that we mean to raise here. In Part II, the centerpiece of the Article, we offer a few remarks on moral foundations and examine some standard objections to capital punishment that might seem plausible even in light of the current findings. We focus in particular on the view that capital punishment is objectionable because it requires affirmative and intentional state â€Å"action,† not merely an â€Å"omission. † The act/omission distinction, we suggest, systematically misfires when applied to government, which is a moral agent with distinctive features. The act/omission distinction may not even be intelligible in the context of government, which always faces a choice among policy regimes, and in that sense cannot help but â€Å"act. † Even if the distinction between acts and omissions can be rendered intelligible in regulatory settings, its moral relevance is obscure. Some acts are morally obligatory, while some omissions are morally culpable. If capital punishment has significant deterrent effects, we suggest that for government to omit to impose it is morally blameworthy, even on a deontological account of morality. Deontological accounts typically recognize a consequentialist override to baseline prohibitions. If each execution saves an average of eighteen lives, then it is plausible to think that the override is triggered, in turn triggering an obligation to adopt capital punishment. Once the act/omission distinction is rejected where government is concerned, it becomes clear that the most familiar, and plausible, objections to capital punishment deal with only one side of the ledger: the objections fail to take account of the exceedingly arbitrary deaths that capital punishment may deter. The realm of homicide, as we shall call it, is replete with its own arbitrariness. We consider rule-of-law concerns about the irreversibility of capital punishment and its possibly random or invidious administration, a strict scrutiny principle that capital punishment should not be permitted if other means for producing the same level of deterrence are available, and concerns about slippery slopes. We suggest that while some of these complaints have Vu All over Again? , 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 03 (2005); see also Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Critical Review of New Evidence: Hearings on the Future of Capital Punishment in the State of New York Before the New York State Assemb. Standing Comm. on Codes, Assemb. Standing Comm. on Judiciary, and Assemb. Standing Comm. on Correction, 2005 Leg. , 228th Sess. 1-12 (N. Y. 2005) (statement of Jeffrey Fagan, Professor of Law and Pub. Health, Columbia Univ. ), available at www. deathpenaltyinfo. org/FaganTestimony. pdf [hereinafter Det errence and the Death Penalty]. For a response to Fagan’s testimony, see generally Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 9. SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 710 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 merit, they do not count as decisive objections to capital punishment, because they embody a flawed version of the act/omission distinction and generally overlook the fact that the moral objections to capital punishment apply even more strongly to the murders that capital punishment apparently deters. In Part III, we conjecture that various cognitive and social mechanisms, lacking any claim to moral relevance, may cause many individuals and groups to subscribe to untenable versions of the distinction between acts and omissions or to discount the lifesaving potential of capital punishment while exaggerating the harms that it causes. An important concern here is a sort of misplaced concreteness, stemming from heuristics such as salience and availability. The single person executed is often more visible nd more salient in public discourse than any abstract statistical persons whose murders might be deterred by a single execution. If those people, and their names and faces, were highly visible, we suspect that many of the objections to capital punishment would at least be shaken. As environmentalists have often argued, â€Å"statistical persons† should not be treated as irrelevant abstractions. 17 The point holds for criminal justice no less than for pollution controls. Part IV expands upon the implications of our view and examines some unresolved puzzles. Here we emphasize that we hold no brief for capital punishment across all contexts or in the abstract. The crucial question is what the facts show in particular domains. We mean to include here a plea not only for continuing assessment of the disputed evidence, but also for a disaggregated approach. Future research and resulting policies would do well to take separate account of various regions and of various classes of offenders and offenses. We also emphasize that our argument is limited to the setting of life-life tradeoffs— in which the taking of a life by the state will reduce the number of lives taken overall. We express no view about cases in which that condition does not hold—for example, the possibility of capital punishment for serious offenses other than killing, with rape being the principal historical example, and with rape of children being a currently contested problem. Such cases involve distinctively difficult moral problems that we mean to bracket here. A brief conclusion follows. I. EVIDENCE For many years, the deterrent effect of capital punishment was sharply disputed. 18 In the 1970s, Isaac Ehrlich conducted the first multivariate 17. Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 189 (2000). 18. Compare, e. g. , Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397, 398 (1975) (estimating each execution deters eight murders), with William J. Bowers Glenn L. Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich’s Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L. J. 187, 187 (1975) (finding Ehrlich’s data and methods unreliable). A good overview is Robert Weisberg, The Death SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 711 egression analyses of the death penalty, based on time-series data from 1933 to 1967, and concluded that each execution deterred as many as eight murders. 19 But subsequent studies raised many questions about Ehrlich’s conclusions—by showing, for example, that the deterrent effects of the death penalty would be eliminated if data from 1965 through 1969 were eliminated. 20 It wo uld be fair to say that the deterrence hypothesis could not be confirmed by the studies that have been completed in the twenty years after Ehrlich first wrote. 21 More recent evidence, however, has given new life to Ehrlich’s hypothesis. 2 A wave of sophisticated multiple regression studies have exploited a newly available form of data, so-called â€Å"panel data,† that uses all information from a set of units (states or counties) and follows that data over an extended period of time. A leading study used county-level panel data from 3054 U. S. counties between 1977 and 1996. 23 The authors found that the murder rate is significantly reduced by both death sentences and executions. The most striking finding was that on average, each execution results in eighteen fewer murders. 24 Other econometric studies also find a substantial deterrent effect. In two papers, Paul Zimmerman uses state-level panel data from 1978 onwards to measure the deterrent effect of execution rates and execution methods. He estimates that each execution deters an average of fourteen murders. 25 Using state-level data from 1977 to 1997, H. Naci Mocan and R. Kaj Gittings find that each execution deters five murders on average. 26 They also find that increases in the murder rate result when people are removed from death row Penalty Meets Social Science: Deterrence and Jury Behavior Under New Scrutiny, 1 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 151 (2005). 19. See Ehrlich, supra note 18, at 398; Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741 (1977). 20. For this point and an overview of many other criticisms of Ehrlich’s conclusions, see Richard O. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177 (1981). 21. See id. ; Weisberg, supra note 18, at 155-57. 22. Even as this evidence was being developed, one of us predicted, perhaps rashly, that the debate would remain inconclusive for the foreseeable future. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N. Y. U. L. REV. 74, 100-01 (2000). 23. See Dezhbakhsh et al. , supra note 9, at 359. 24. Id. at 373. 25. Zimmerman, Alternative Execution Methods, supra note 9; Zimmerman, State Executions, supra note 9, at 190. 26. Mocan Gittings, supra note 9, at 453. Notably, no clear evidence of a deterrent effect from capital punishment emerges from Lawrence Katz et al. , Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. ECON. REV. 318, 330 (2003), which finds that the estimate of deterrence is extremely sensitive to the choice of specification, with the largest estimate paralleling that in Ehrlich, supra note 18. Note, however, that the principal finding in Katz et al. , supra, is that prison deaths do have a strong deterrent effect and a stunningly large one—with each prison death producing a reduction of â€Å"30-100 violent crimes and a similar number of property crimes. † Id. at 340. SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 712 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 and when death sentences are commuted. 27 A study by Joanna Shepherd, based on data from all states from 1997 to 1999, finds that each death sentence deters 4. 5 murders and that an execution deters 3 additional murders. 8 Her study also investigates the contested question whether executions deter crimes of passion and murders by intimates. Although intuition might suggest that such crimes cannot be deterred, her own finding is clear: all categories of murder are deterred by capital punishment. 29 The deterrent effect of the death penalty is also found to be a function of the length of waits on deat h row, with a murder deterred for every 2. 75 years of reduction in the period before execution. 30 Importantly, this study finds that the deterrent effect of capital punishment protects African-American victims even more than whites. 1 In the period between 1972 and 1976, the Supreme Court produced an effective moratorium on capital punishment, and an extensive unpublished study exploits that fact to estimate the deterrent effect. Using state-level data from 1977 to 1999, the authors make before-and-after comparisons, focusing on the murder rate in each state before and after the death penalty was suspended and reinstated. 32 The authors find a substantial deterrent effect: â€Å"[T]he data indicate that murder rates increased immediately after the moratorium was imposed and decreased directly after the moratorium was lifted, providing support for the deterrence hypothesis. 33 A recent study offers more refined findings. 34 Disaggregating the data on a state-by-state basis, Joanna Shepherd finds that the nationwide deterrent effect of capital punishment is entirely driven by only six states—and that no deterrent effect can be found in the twenty-one other states that have restored capital punishment. 35 What distinguishes the six from the twenty-one? The answer, she contends, lies in the fact that states showing a deterrent effect are executing more people than states that are not. In fact the data show a 27. Mocan Gittings, supra note 9, at 453, 456. 8. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, supra note 9, at 308. 29. Id. at 305. Shepherd notes: Many researchers have argued that some types of murders cannot be deterred: they assert that murders committed during arguments or other crime-of-passion moments are not premeditated and therefore undeterrable. My results indicate that this assertion is wrong: the rates of crime-of-passion and murders by intimates—crimes previously believed to be undeterrable—all decrease in execution months. Id. 30. Id. at 283. 31. Id. at 308. 32. Hashem Dezhbakhsh Joanna M. Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Evidence from a â€Å"Judicial Experiment,† at tbls. 3-4 (Am. Law Economics Ass’n Working Paper No. 18, 2004), available at http://law. bepress. com/cgi/viewcontent. cgi? article=1017context=alea (last visited Dec. 1, 2005). 33. Id. at 3-4. 34. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 9. 35. Id. at 207. SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 713 â€Å"threshold effect†: deterrence is found in states that had at least nine total executions between 1977 and 1996. In states below that threshold, no deterrence effect can be found. 36 This finding is intuitively plausible. Unless executions reach a certain level, murderers may act as if the death penalty is so improbable as not to be worthy of concern. 37 Shepherd’s main lesson is that once the level of executions reaches a certain level, the deterrent effect of capital punishment is substantial. All in all, the recent evidence of a deterrent effect from capital punishment seems impressive, especially in light of its â€Å"apparent power and unanimity. 38 But in studies of this kind, it is hard to control for confounding variables, and reasonable doubts inevitably remain. Most broadly, skeptics are likely to question the mechanisms by which capital punishment is said to have a deterrent effect. In the skeptical view, many murderers lack a clear sense of the likelihood and perhaps even the existence of executions in their states; further problems for the deterrence claim are introduced by the fact that capital punishment is imposed infrequently and after long delays. Emphasizing the weakness of the deterrent signal, Steven Levitt has suggested that â€Å"it is hard to believe that fear of execution would be a driving force in a rational criminal’s calculus in modern America. †39 And, of course, some criminals do not act rationally: many murders are committed in a passionate state that does not lend itself to an all-things-considered analysis on the part of perpetrators. More narrowly, it remains possible that the recent findings will be exposed as statistical artifacts or found to rest on flawed econometric methods. Work by Richard Berk, based on his independent review of the state-level panel data from Mocan and Gittings, offers multiple objections to those authors’ finding of deterrence. 40 For example, Texas executes more people than any other state, and when Texas is removed from the data, the evidence of deterrence is severely weakened. 41 Removal of the apparent â€Å"outlier state[s]† that execute the largest numbers of people seems to eliminate the finding of deterrence 36. Id. at 239-41. 37. Less intuitively, Shepherd finds that in thirteen of the states that had capital punishment but executed few people, capital punishment actually increased the murder rate. She attributes this puzzling result to what she calls the â€Å"brutalization effect,† by which capital punishment devalues human life and teaches people about the legitimacy of vengeance. Id. at 40-41. 38. See Weisberg, supra note 18, at 159. 39. See Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 175 (2004). 0. See Berk, supra note 16; Deterrence and the Death Penalty, supra note 16, at 6-12. 41. Berk, supra note 16, at 320. It has also been objected that the studies do not take account of the availability of sentences that involve life without the possibility of parole; such sentences might have a deterrent effect equal to or beyond that of capital punishment. See Deterrence and the Death Penalty, supra note 16 . A response to Berk can found in Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 9. SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 714 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 altogether. 42 Berk concludes that the findings of Mocan and Gittings are driven by six states with more than five executions each year. Berk, however, proceeds by presenting data in graphic form; he offers no regression analyses in support of his criticism. These concerns about the evidence should be taken as useful cautions. At the level of theory, it is plausible that if criminals are fully rational, they should not be deterred by infrequent and much-delayed executions; the deterrent signal may well be too weak to affect their behavior. But suppose that like most people, criminals are boundedly rational, assessing probabilities with the aid of heuristics. 43 If executions are highly salient and cognitively available, some prospective murderers will overestimate their likelihood, and will be deterred as a result. Other prospective murderers will not pay much attention to the fact that execution is unlikely, focusing instead on the badness of the outcome (execution) rather than its low probability. 44 Few murderers are likely to assess the deterrent signal by multiplying the harm of execution against its likelihood. If this is so, then the deterrent signal will be larger than might be suggested by the product of that multiplication. Levitt’s theoretical claim assumes that prospective murderers are largely rational in their reaction to the death penalty and its probability—standing by itself, a plausible conjecture but no more. As for the recent data, it is true that evidence of deterrence is reduced or eliminated through the removal of Texas and other states in which executions are most common and in which evidence of deterrence is strongest. 5 But removal of those states seems to be an odd way to resolve the contested questions. States having the largest numbers of executions are most likely to deter, and it does not seem to make sense to exclude those states as â€Å"outliers. †46 By way of comparison, imagine a study attempting to determine what characteristics of baseball teams most increase the chance of winning the World Series. Imagine also a criticism of the study, p arallel to Berk’s, which complained that data about the New York Yankees should be thrown out, on the ground that the Yankees have won so many times as to be â€Å"outliers. This would be an odd idea, because empiricists must go where the evidence is; in the case of capital punishment, the outliers provide much of the relevant evidence. Recall here Shepherd’s finding, compatible with the analysis of some skeptics, that the deterrent effect occurs only in states in which there is some threshold 42. Berk, supra note 16, at 320-24; Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 9. 43. On bounded rationality in general, see RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991). 44. See Yuval Rottenstreich Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185, 188 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L. J. 61 (2002). 45. See Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 9. 46. Id. SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 715 number of executions. 47 But let us suppose, plausibly, that the evidence of deterrence remains inconclusive. Even so, it would not follow that the death penalty as such fails to deter. As Shepherd also finds in her most recent study,48 more frequent executions, carried out in closer proximity to convictions, are predicted to amplify the deterrent signal for both rational and boundedly rational criminals. We can go further. A degree of doubt, with respect to the current system, need not be taken to suggest that existing evidence is irrelevant for purposes of policy and law. In regulation as a whole, it is common to embrace some version of the precautionary principle49—the idea that steps should be taken to prevent significant harm even if cause-and-effect relationships remain unclear and even if the risk is not likely to come to fruition. Even if we reject strong versions of the precautionary principle,50 it hardly seems sensible that governments should ignore evidence demonstrating a significant possibility that a certain step will save large numbers of innocent lives. For capital punishment, critics often seem to assume that evidence on deterrent effects should be ignored if reasonable questions can be raised about the evidence’s reliability. But as a general rule, this is implausible. In most contexts, the existence of legitimate questions is hardly an adequate reason to ignore evidence of severe harm. If it were, many environmental controls would be in serious jeopardy. 51 We do not mean to suggest that government should commit what many people consider to be, prima facie, a serious moral wrong simply on the basis of speculation that this action will do some good. But a degree of reasonable doubt need not be taken as sufficient to doom a form of punishment if there is a significant possibility that it will save large numbers of lives. It is possible that capital punishment saves lives on net, even if it has zero deterrent effect. A life-life tradeoff may arise in several ways. One possibility, the one we focus on here, is that capital punishment deters homicides. Another possibility is that capital punishment has no deterrent effect, but saves lives just 7. See id. 48. Id. 49. For overviews of the precautionary principle and related issues, see INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Tim O’Riordan James Cameron eds. , 1994); ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002). 50. See, e. g. , Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in RETHINKING RISK AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Julian Morris ed. , 2000). 51. Indeed, those skeptical of capital punishment invoke evidence to the effect that capital punishment did not deter, and argue, plausibly, that it would be a mistake to wait for definitive evidence before ceasing with a punishment that could not be shown to reduce homicide. See Lempert, supra note 20, at 1222-24. This is a kind of precautionary principle, arguing against the most aggressive forms of punishment if the evidence suggested that they did not deter. We are suggesting the possibility of a mirror-image precautionary principle when the evidence goes the other way. SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 716 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 by incapacitating those who would otherwise kill again in the future. 52 Consider those jurisdictions that eschew capital punishment altogether. What sanction can such jurisdictions really apply to those who have already been sentenced to life in prison without parole? Sentences of this sort may take more lives overall by increasing the number of essentially unpunishable withinprison homicides of guards and fellow inmates. 53 Many murderers are killed in prison even in states that lack the death penalty. 4 And if murderers are eventually paroled into the general population, some of them will kill again. Overall, it is quite possible that the permanent incapacitation of murderers through execution might save lives on net. A finding that capital punishment deters—and deterrence is our focus here—is sufficient but not necessary to find a life-life tradeoff. In any event, our goal here is not to reach a f inal judgment about the evidence. It is to assess capital punishment given the assumption of a substantial deterrent effect. In what follows, therefore, we will stipulate to the validity of the evidence and consider its implications for morality and law. Those who doubt the evidence might ask themselves how they would assess the moral questions if they were ultimately convinced that life-life tradeoffs were actually involved—as, for example, in hostage situations in which officials are authorized to use deadly force to protect the lives of innocent people. II. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: MORAL FOUNDATIONS AND FOUR OBJECTIONS Assume, then, that capital punishment does save a significant number of innocent lives. On what assumptions should that form of punishment be deemed morally unacceptable, rather than morally obligatory? Why should the deaths of those convicted of capital murder, an overwhelmingly large fraction of whom are guilty in fact, be considered a more serious moral wrong than the deaths of a more numerous group who are certainly innocents? We consider, and ultimately reject, several responses. Our first general contention is that opposition to capital punishment trades on a form of the distinction between acts and omissions. Whatever the general force of that distinction, its application to government systematically fails, because government is a distinctive kind of moral agent. Our second general contention is that, apart from direct state involvement, the features that make capital punishment morally objectionable to its critics are also features of the very murders that capital punishment deters. The principal difference, on the empirical assumptions we are making, is that in a legal regime without capital punishment far more people die, and those people are innocent of any 2. See Ronald J. Allen Amy Shavell, Further Reflections on the Guillotine, 95 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 625, 630-31 (2005). 53. See id. at 630 n. 9. 54. See Katz et al. , supra note 26, at 340. SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 717 wrongdoing. No one denies that arbitrariness in the system of capital punishment is a serious problem. But even if the ex isting system is viewed in its worst light, it involves far less arbitrariness than does the realm of homicide. Let us begin, however, with foundational issues. A. Morality and Death On a standard view, it is impossible to come to terms with the moral questions about capital punishment without saying something about the foundations of moral judgments. We will suggest, however, that sectarian commitments at the foundational level are for the most part irrelevant to the issues here. If it is stipulated that substantial deterrence exists, both consequentialist and deontological accounts of morality will or should converge upon the view that capital punishment is morally obligatory. Consequentialists will come to that conclusion because capital punishment minimizes killings overall. Deontologists will do so because an opposition to killing is, by itself, indeterminate in the face of life-life tradeoffs; because a legal regime with capital punishment has a strong claim to be more respectful of life’s value than does a legal regime lacking capital punishment; and because modern deontologists typically subscribe to a consequentialist override or escape hatch, one that makes otherwise mpermissible actions obligatory if necessary to prevent many deaths—precisely what we are assuming is true of capital punishment. Only those deontologists who both insist upon a strong distinction between state actions and state omissions and who reject a consequentialist override will believe the deterrent effect of capital punishment to be irrelevant in principle. Suppose that we accept consequentialism and believe that government actions should be evaluated in terms of their effects on aggregate welfare. If we do so, the evidence of deterrence strongly supports a moral argument in favor of the death penalty—a form of punishment that, by hypothesis, seems to produce a net gain in overall welfare. Of course, there are many complications here; for example, the welfare of many people might increase as a result of knowing that capital punishment exists, and the welfare of many other people might decrease for the same reason. A full consequentialist calculus would require a more elaborate assessment than we aim to provide here. The only point is that if capital punishment produces significantly fewer deaths on balance, there should be a strong consequentialist presumption on its behalf; any argument against capital punishment, on consequentialist grounds, will face a steep uphill struggle. To be sure, it is also possible to imagine forms of consequentialism that reject welfarism as implausibly reductionist and see violations of rights as part of the set of consequences that must be taken into account in deciding what to SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 03 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 718 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 do. 55 For some such consequentialists, killings are, under ordinary circumstances, a violation of rights, and this point is highly relevant to any judgment about killings. But even if the point is accepted, capital punishment may be required, not prohibited, on consequentialist grounds, simply because and to the extent that it minimizes rights violations. Private murders also violate rights, and the rights-respecting consequentialist must take those actions into account. But imagine that we are deontologists, believing that actions by government and others should not be evaluated in consequentialist terms; how can capital punishment be morally permissible, let alone obligatory? For some deontologists, capital punishment is obligatory for moral reasons alone. 56 But suppose, as other deontologists believe, that under ordinary circumstances, the state’s killing of a human being is a wrong and that its wrongness does not depend on an inquiry into whether the action produces a net increase in welfare. For many critics of capital punishment, a deontological intuition is central; evidence of deterrence is irrelevant because moral wrongdoing by the state is not justified even if it can be defended on utilitarian grounds. Compare a situation in which a state seeks to kill an innocent person, knowing that the execution will prevent a number of private killings; deontologists believe that the unjustified execution cannot be supported even if the state is secure in its knowledge of the execution’s beneficial effects. Of course, it is contentious to claim that capital punishment is a moral wrong. But if it is, then significant deterrence might be entirely beside the point. It is simply true that many intuitive objections to capital punishment rely on a belief of this kind: just as execution of an innocent person is a moral wrong, one that cannot be justified on consequentialist grounds, so too the execution of a guilty person is a moral wrong, whatever the evidence shows. Despite all this, our claims here do not depend on accepting consequentialism or rejecting the deontological objection to evaluating unjustified killings in consequentialist terms. The argument is instead that by itself and in the abstract, this objection is indeterminate on the moral status of capital punishment. To the extent possible, we intend to bracket the most fundamental questions and to suggest that whatever one’s view of the foundations of morality, the objection to the death penalty is difficult to sustain under the empirical assumptions that we have traced. Taken in its most sympathetic light, a deontological objection to capital punishment is unconvincing if states that refuse to impose the death penalty produce, by that 55. Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 3, 15-19 (1982). 56. See Pojman, supra note 4, at 58-59. As noted below, the case of Israel is a good test for such deontologists; Israel does not impose the death penalty, in part on the ground that executions of terrorists would likely increase terrorism. Do deontologists committed to capital punishment believe that Israel is acting immorally? In our view, they ought not to do so, at least if the empirical assumption is right and if the protection of lives is what morality requires. SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 719 very refusal, significant numbers of additional deaths. Recall the realm of homicide: for deontologists who emphasize life’s value and object to the death penalty, the problem is acute if the refusal to impose that penalty predictably leads to a significant number of additional murders. In a hostage situation, police officers are permitted to kill (execute) those who have taken hostages if this step is reasonably deemed necessary to save those who have been taken hostage. If the evidence of deterrence is convincing, why is capital punishment so different in principle? Of course, these points might be unresponsive to those who believe that execution of a guilty person is morally equivalent to execution of an innocent person and not properly subject to a recognition of life-life tradeoffs. We will explore this position in more detail below. And we could envision a form of deontology that refuses any exercise in aggregation—one that would refuse to authorize, or compel, a violation of rights even if the violation is necessary to prevent a significantly larger number of rights violations. But most modern deontologists reject this position, instead admitting a consequentialist override to baseline deontological prohibitions. 57 Although the threshold at which the consequentialist override is triggered varies with different accounts, we suggest below that if each execution deters some eighteen murders, the override is plausibly triggered. To distill these points, the only deontological accounts that are inconsistent with our argument are those that both (1) embrace a distinction between state actions and state omissions and (2) reject a consequentialist override. To those who subscribe to this complex of views, and who consider capital punishment a violation of rights, our argument will not be convincing. In the end, however, we believe that it is difficult to sustain the set of moral assumptions that would bar capital punishment if it is the best means of preventing significant numbers of innocent deaths. Indeed, we believe that many of those who think that they hold those assumptions are motivated by other considerations—especially a failure to give full weight to statistical lives—on which we focus in Part III. B. Acts and Omissions A natural response to our basic concern would invoke the widespread intuition that capital punishment involves intentional state â€Å"action,† while the failure to deter private murders is merely an â€Å"omission† by the state. In our view, this appealing and intuitive line of argument goes rather badly wrong. The critics of capital punishment have been led astray by uncritically applying the act/omission distinction to a regulatory setting. Their position condemns the â€Å"active† infliction of death by governments but does not condemn the â€Å"inactive† production of death that comes from the refusal to maintain a system 57. For an overview, see Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 898-901 (2000). SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 720 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 of capital punishment. The basic problem is that even if this selective condemnation can be justified at the level of individual behavior, it is difficult to defend for governments. 58 A great deal of work has to be done to explain why â€Å"inactive,† but causal, government decisions should not be part of the moral calculus. Suppose that we endorse the deontological position that it is wrong to take human lives, even if overall welfare is promoted by taking them. Why does the system of capital punishment violate that position, if the failure to impose capital punishment also takes lives? Perhaps our argument about unjustified selectivity is blind to morally relevant factors that condemn capital punishment and that buttress the act/omission distinction in this context. There are two possible points here, one involving intention and the other involving causation. First, a government (acting through agents) that engages in capital punishment intends to take lives; it seeks to kill. A government that does not engage in capital punishment, and therefore provides less deterrence, does not intend to kill. The deaths that result are the unintended and unsought byproduct of an effort to respect life. Surely— it might be said—this is a morally relevant difference. Second, a government that inflicts capital punishment ensures a simple and direct causal chain between its own behavior and the taking of human lives. When a government rejects capital punishment, the causal chain is much more complex; the taking of human lives is an indirect consequence of the government’s decision, one that is mediated by the actions of a murderer. The government authorizes its agents to inflict capital punishment, but it does not authorize private parties to murder; indeed, it forbids murder. Surely that is a morally relevant difference, too. We will begin, in Part II. B. 1, with questions about whether the act/omission distinction is conceptually intelligible in regulatory settings. Here the suggestion is that there just is no way to speak or think coherently about government â€Å"actions† as opposed to government â€Å"omissions,† because government cannot help but act, in some way or another, when choosing how individuals are to be regulated. In Part II. B. 2, we suggest that the distinction between government acts and omissions, even if conceptually coherent, is not morally relevant to the question of capital punishment. Some governmental actions are morally obligatory, and some governmental omissions are blameworthy. In this setting, we suggest, government is morally obligated to adopt capital punishment and morally at fault if it declines to do so. 1. Is the act/omission distinction coherent with respect to government? In our view, any effort to distinguish between acts and omissions goes 58. Compare debates over going to war: Some pacifists insist, correctly, that acts of war will result in the loss of life, including civilian life. But a refusal to go to war will often result in the loss of life, including civilian life. SUNSTEIN VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 721 wrong by overlooking the distinctive features of government as a moral agent. If correct, this point has broad implications for criminal and civil law. Whatever the general status of the act/omission distinction as a matter of moral philosophy,59 the distinction is least impressive when applied to government, because the most plausible underlying considerations do not apply to official actors. 0 The most fundamental point is that, unlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice between or among possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context, and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private actio n, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. 1 Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action—for example, private killing— becomes obscure when the government formally forbids private action but chooses a set of policy instruments that do not adequately or fully discourage it. To be sure, a system of punishments that only weakly deters homicide, relative to other feasible punishments, does not quite authorize homicide, but that system is not properly characterized as an omission, and little turns on whether it can be so characterized. Suppose, for example, that government fails to characterize certain actions—say, sexual harassment—as tortious or violative of civil rights law and that it therefore permits employers to harass employees as they choose or to discharge employees for failing to submit to sexual harassment. It would be unhelpful to characterize the result as a product of governmental â€Å"inaction. † If employers are permitted to discharge employees for refusing to submit to sexual harassment, it is because the law is allocating certain entitlements to employers rather than employees. Or consider the context of ordinary torts. When Homeowner B sues Factory A over air pollution, a decision not to rule for Homeowner B is not a form of inaction: it is the allocation to Factory A of a property right to pollute. In such cases, an apparent government omission is an action simply because it is an allocation of legal rights. Any decision that allocates such rights, by creating entitlements 59. For discussion of the philosophical controversy over acts and omissions, see generally RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993); Frances M. Kamm, Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of Life’s Dominion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 160 (1995) (reviewing DWORKIN, supra); Tom Stacy, Acts, Omissions, and the Necessity of Killing Innocents, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 481 (2002). 60. Here we proceed in the spirit of Robert Goodin by treating government as a distinctive sort of moral agen How to cite Against and for Capital Punishment, Papers

Management and Organizational Behavior Activities

Question: Discuss about the Management and Organizational Behavior Activities. Answer: Introduction Organizational behavior is the way in which employees of an organization behave within a group. Effective organizational behavior can maximize the output of individual team members of organization (Leana and Meuris 2015). This study will identify the problem mentioned in the case study for Philippine Daily Inquirer. It is a well-known newspaper readership and most wide read newspaper in Philippine (inquirer.net 2016). The study will highlight the organizational culture and subculture of the organization. Apart from that, the study will also describe the centralization, departmentalization, team development and leadership of the organization. Problem Identification List of symptoms for problems Tough competition with online news Employee resistance to embrace change Less cooperation between old employees and new employees Ineffective leadership style Philippine Daily Inquirer was the most profitable and leading newspaper readership for decades from the year 2001 (inquirer.net 2016). The exceptional hard-hitting approach of journalism had made loyal readers for the newspapers. However, as the time went by, more and more advanced mobile gadgets and computers had launched and people started to access more crispy news on their gadgets by only having internet. Readers became able to access more updated news from anywhere they want. It was the prime root cause for problem for the organization. On the hand, the newspaper organization was not able to provide updated information, as they were unable to incorporate 24 hours news cycle (Lewis and Usher 2013). People started to read news online, as they provide news as soon as it occurred. In such situation, Philippine Daily Inquirer started to lag behind due to its not so updated information (Karimi and Walter 2016). Apart from that, in case of news website design, the employees of the orga nization were resistant to change. Due to the micro-management style of the Letty (editor-in-chief), the employees became un-cooperative among each other. It was a hindrance towards the new changes of news website design. Analysis Organizational Culture and sub-culture Though Philippine Daily Inquirer was full of loyal and excellent journalists for delivering news, they often not got good organizational culture in their workplace. First, the editor-in-chief Letty was unable to manage her employees, due her constant late arrival in the office. Letty used to follow micro-management leadership style in directing the employees of the organization. The editors always deferred to the instruction and judgment of Letty. According to Charles Handys organizational culture theory, the organization used to follow power culture (Glisson 2015). The leaders used to take all the decisions for the organization and the employees did not get any scope to interfere in decision-making process. Apart from that, the leaders removed the autonomy and transferred the accountability away from the editors. It ultimately lowered down the morale of the employees and hampered the work progress of the organization (Hogan and Coote 2014). The leadership style of the organization w as autocratic in nature. The employees were to follow the strict order and dictation of the leaders. Apart from that, a lack of cooperation had been found among the old employees and new employees in regards to their work process and skills. Reason for resistance to change It had been found that most of the conservative employees were resistant to embrace the new changes of Philippine Daily Inquirer. One of the most important reasons of resistance to change was fear of unknown. The employees of the organization were mostly acquainted with traditional approach of printing the news in the paper (Pieterse, Canils and Homan 2012). While, the organization launched its own website, it became a completely new concept to the employees about which they were unaware. The lethargy to learn new things made them to be resistance in adopting this change. Apart from that, the probability of huge work pressure and long working time due to incorporation of 24 hours news cycle were the other reasons for employee resistance towards changes (Fugate, Prussia and Kinicki 2012). Furthermore, a lack of mistrust between the management and employees can also be drawn for the employee resistance of the organization. Level of centralization and its effects According to Lanaj et al. (2013), centralization in an organization can be defined as hierarchy in decision-making process, where only top management takes organizational decisions. Philippine Daily Inquirer followed strict centralization structure in their organization. The editor-in-chief Letty was the only person to take critical decision about the organization. No news went on the front page of the newspaper without the scrutiny and guidance of Letty. Only competent journalists used to report to her. Oftentimes, she overruled much the decision taken by junior editors before her entrance in office. It ultimately delayed the newspaper process and distribution of newspaper (Glisson 2015). In this way, the high level of centralization process enabled the competitors, especially the web-based newspaper organization to publish news much earlier. Thus, the organization began to lose competence in the competition level. Apart from that, constant overruling and lack of scope to be involve d in organizational decision-making process had ultimately decreased the enthusiasm level of the employees. They became less willing to work hard for the new changes of the organization. Current Departmentalization Approach It had been found that, in the beginning, all the employees used to work in one large room. It denotes that the organization did not follow such departmentalization approach. The departmentalization approach of Philippine Daily Inquirer was highly centralized, where only management was responsible for taking important decision of the organization (Hogan and Coote 2014). The coordination between the management and employees was very less and thus, many queries of the employees remain unresolved. It ultimately hampered the work process of the newspaper production and delivering process. However, with an intension to compete with the web-based news making organizations, Philippine Daily Inquirer had formed independent web-focused group. However, it such case also, lack of cooperation had been found between new employee group and old employee group. Old employee group started to see new employee as their rivals. This lack of cooperation often led to employee confliction that slowed down the work progress level of the organization (Karimi and Walter 2016). It also decreased the quality of new contents of the organization. Team Development Stage According to team development theory of Tuckman, developing a team takes time and the team members often go through specific stages for being a part of united team. As per this theory, an efficient team is formed through five stages namely forming, storming, norming, performing and adjourning (Chapman and Fitzgerald 2015). In forming stage, the members usually remain polite and anxious about the work to understand it properly. In storming stage, team members start to go beyond the boundaries set in forming stage. This stage starts with confliction among the team members regarding working style and role of leadership (Pelegrini Morita and Marie Burns 2014). People may feel overwhelmed by the work pressure and confliction may arise regarding the work skills. In norming stage, members start to understand each other and become an unity. In performing stage, ultimate work is performed having a common goal of the organization. Lastly, in adjourning stage, the team is disbanded after comple ting a specific project. The editorial group of Philippine Daily Inquirer is considered to be in storming stage, as there is a huge confliction between the old employees and new employees (Chapman and Fitzgerald 2015). The new employees had more knowledge about the internet than old employees had. Therefore, the old employees started to see them as their rivals regarding the working style and work skills. It is the high indication of the editorial group to be in storming stage. Affects of Lettys leadership style and behavior in Inquirers change process Letty is the editor-in-chief of Philippine Daily Inquirer and she used to follow micro-management leadership style in managing the employees. Now news content is published the front page of the newspaper with her guidance and scrutiny (Renko et al. 2015). She did not allow the employees in organizational decision-making process. Therefore, the employees were unaware about the rationality new web designing for online news. This unawareness had made them to be resistant towards new changes incorporated in the organization (Fugate, Prussia and Kinicki 2012). Apart from that, Letty often overruled the decision of the employees. She never provided value to the junior employees, which minimized their interest in changing with new changed procedure of the organization. Recommendation Sandys dos towards changing organizational culture Sandy should change the leadership style of the organization. Instead of initiating micro-management leadership style, she should initiate transformational leadership style for managing employees. The leaders should be supportive in nature instead of overruling the decision of employees. The CEO should smoothly convey the exact rationality of the new changed process to the employees so that they can be interested in it. Apart from that, the employees would be highly interested to adopt the new changes, when they would be allowed in organizational decision-making process. Furthermore, according to democratic leadership theory, Sandy should develop an effective and cooperative team by effective leadership style. Sandy should initiate training session for the old employees, who have lack of technical knowledge needed for operating websites in making online news. Apart from that, the CEO of the organization should contribute rewards to the employees for working in structured manner and p roviding output as per the organizational standard. Reference List Chapman, G.R. and Fitzgerald, J., 2015. The role of innate characteristics in enhancing team development.Employment Relations Record,15(1), p.58. Fugate, M., Prussia, G.E. and Kinicki, A.J., 2012. Managing employee withdrawal during organizational change the role of threat appraisal.Journal of Management,38(3), pp.890-914. Glisson, C., 2015. The role of organizational culture and climate in innovation and effectiveness.Human Service Organizations: Management, Leadership Governance,39(4), pp.245-250. Hogan, S.J. and Coote, L.V., 2014. Organizational culture, innovation, and performance: A test of Schein's model.Journal of Business Research,67(8), pp.1609-1621. Inquirer.net. 2016.INQUIRER.net. [online] Available at: https://www.inquirer.net/ [Accessed 15 Sep. 2016]. Karimi, J. and Walter, Z., 2016. Corporate entrepreneurship, disruptive business model innovation adoption, and its performance: The case of the newspaper industry.Long Range Planning,49(3), pp.342-360. Lanaj, K., Hollenbeck, J.R., Ilgen, D.R., Barnes, C.M. and Harmon, S.J., 2013. The double-edged sword of decentralized planning in multiteam systems.Academy of Management Journal,56(3), pp.735-757. Leana, C.R. and Meuris, J., 2015. Living to work and working to live: Income as a driver of organizational behavior.The Academy of Management Annals,9(1), pp.55-95. Lewis, S.C. and Usher, N., 2013. Open source and journalism: Toward new frameworks for imagining news innovation.Media, Culture Society,35(5), pp.602-619. Pelegrini Morita, P. and Marie Burns, C., 2014. Trust tokens in team development.Team Performance Management,20(1/2), pp.39-64. Pieterse, J.H., Canils, M.C. and Homan, T., 2012. Professional discourses and resistance to change.Journal of Organizational Change Management,25(6), pp.798-818. Renko, M., El Tarabishy, A., Carsrud, A.L. and Brnnback, M., 2015. Understanding and measuring entrepreneurial leadership style.Journal of Small Business Management,53(1), pp.54-74.

Servant Leadership Essay Example

Servant Leadership Essay Outline the key features of one theory/model of leadership servant-leadership vision Sergiovanni (2005) viewed vision as such a crucial element for change because it greatly influences the process of transformation in the servant-leader and in teachers, parents, and students and the school community as a whole. A good vision is meaningful if it is credible and can propel constituents to embrace it. Sergiovanni (1993) prescribed servant-leadership as the leadership style which could effectively meet the needs of the changing landscape in contemporary schools, Stewardship Sergiovanni (1992) explains that stewardship ? involves the leader‘s personal responsibility to manage her or his life and affairs with proper regard for the rights of other people and for the common welfare? (p. 139). Effective schools provide an environment for the common good of all students, regardless of their particular needs. Caring Sergiovanni(1994) claims that â€Å"caring as an integral part of shared community† (p. 146). Commitment to the growth of people The servant-leader is committed to the individual growth of human beings and will do everything they can to nurture others. Sergiovanni (2001) puts this in a school perspective: The leader serves as head follower by leading the discussion about what is worth following, and by modeling, teaching, and helping others to become better followers. When this happens, the emphasis changes from direct leadership based on rules and personality, to a different kind of leadership based on stewardship and service (p. 34). Moral community leader â€Å"Moral community provides for moral connections among teachers, students, and it advocates helping all of them to become self-managing. We will write a custom essay sample on Servant Leadership specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on Servant Leadership specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on Servant Leadership specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer These connections satisfy the needs for coordination and commitment that any enterprise must meet to be successful. † â€Å"Moral connections are stronger than the connections that come from extrinsic or intrinsic rewards. Moral connections are grounded in cultural norms rather than in psychological needs. † â€Å"The leader serves as head follower by leading the discussion about what is worth following and by modeling, teaching, and helping others to become better followers. â€Å"When this happens, the emphasis changes from direct leadership based on rules and personality, to a different kind of leadership based on stewardship and service. † The secret: To replace communication with conversation Conversation may not be able to move mountains, but it can get teachers, citizens, state officials, and other stakeholders to think differently, to join together in a union of mutual responsibility, and to make good decisions together for children. Since conversation is relational reciprocal, it requires commitment to mutuality . Mutuality implies the sharing of power with, by, and among people regardless of their level or role in a way that recognizes the dignity of each, and to sustain this sharing. And the more that heads practice mutuality by engaging in conversation with others, the more they count. Conversation is the way to bring people together, to build up needed capacity, and to win the commitment needed from everyone to make the school well. (Sergiovanni, 2001) Sees school as community Why is community building important in schools? Community is the tie that binds students and teachers together in special ways, to something more significant than themselves: shared values and ideals. It lifted both teachers ans students to higher levels of self-understanding, commitment, and performance-beyond the reaches of the shortcomings and difficulties they face in their everyday lives†. â€Å"Community can help teachers and students be transformed from a collection of â€Å"Is† to a collective â€Å"we†, thus providing them with a unique and enduring sense of identity, belonging, and place†. Sergiovanni, 1994) Schools can become communities in may different forms: 1. Caring communities 2. Learning communities 3. Professional communities 4. Collegial communities 5. Inclusive communities 6. Inquiring communities (Sergiovanni, 1994, P. 71) Sergiovanni sees a critical link between what happens to teachers and what happens to students. If schools and teachers are going to be successful in getting children to be more curious and more actively involved in their learning, then the adults who teach them likewise will have to be actively engaged, he says. Inquiring classrooms are not likely to flourish in schools where inquiry among teachers is discouraged. A commitment to problem solving is difficult to instill in students who are taught by teachers for whom problem solving is not allowed. Where there is little discourse among teachers, discourse among students will be harder to promote and maintain. And the idea of making classrooms into learning communities for students will remain more rhetoric than real unless schools become learning communities for teachers too, he writes. Teacher development must move center stage in school improvement, Sergiovanni argues. That means, he says, management systems, organizational patterns , and teacher growth strategies must recognize: †¢ Recognize individual differences among teachers; †¢ Encourage teachers to reflect on their own practices; †¢ Give a high priority to conversation and dialogue among teachers; †¢ Provide for collaborative learning among teachers; †¢ Emphasize caring communities; †¢ Call upon teachers to respond morally to their work. Because Sergiovanni believes that theories influence what we see and do, he argues that they also affect the change strategies that schools select. To illustrate, he challenges the notion that schools can be tightly managed into reform, pointing out that . . . teachers are less influenced by management strategies and more influenced by what they believe, by what peers believe and do, and by other more elusive cultural matters. Sergiovanni stresses the need for a school community to come together around shared values and ideas because real schools are managerially loose and culturally tight. That means, he believes, that the change process must be norms based rather than rules based. Such approaches emphasize professional socialization, shared values and purposes, collegiality, and natural interdependence. a. Role is to articulate values and work with community to solve its problems b. Rise above the personal â€Å"†¦. are willing to sacrifice for one another as fellows or sharers of a common fate† Book Review Moral Leadership: Getting to the Heart of School Improvement By Thomas J. Sergiovanni: Sergiovanni discusses living school in leadership rather than just being concerned with the facts and figures involved in playing school. The viewpoint of the author is being concerned about the leadership processes in schools that are presently accepted as the norm. Sergiovanni would like to see school leadership shift to one that is self-motivated by teachers who want to do a great job, not one where the teachers feel they have to as a result of dependency on extrinsic rewards. A school, he says, is a community with a shared sense of values and purpose. He d escribes a virtuous school as one founded on the beliefs that a school must be a community, that this school community includes parents, teachers, students and other community members. He believes that every student can learn, that caring for the whole child is the key to academic success, and that mutual respect and positive expectations are the operating dynamics. Throughout this book, Sergiovanni is attempting to reframe the role of leadership in a school from an old paradigm focused on management and control and the view that a school is a formal organization, to a new paradigm of empowerment through caring, acknowledging the expertise of teachers and students, and facilitating their active participation in the school. Analysis, Impact, and Evaluation ) Critically consider its contribution to thinking on leadership Sergiovanni (1999) encourages consideration of a servant-leadership approach for our present day schools and for our raison d’etre, Such ideas as servant leadership bring with them a different kind of strength- one based on moral authority. †¦. What matters are issues of substance. What are we about? Why? Are students being served? Is the school as learning community being served? What are our obligations to this community? With these questions in mind, how can we best get the job done? (p. 1) Challenges and Tensions of Servant-Leadership Servant-leadership is not an easy choice for success in leadership, nor is it a panacea for all the difficulties of leadership. Besides, the servant-leadership option is fraught with frustrations, hostility, and periods of passivity (Lad Luechauer, 1998; Autry, 2001; Fryer, 2001). For Lad and Luechauer, â€Å"The journey toward becoming a leader who seeks to serve rather that be served is worthy, commendable, and, unfortunately filled with many personal, organizational, and environmental barriers, paradoxes, and downsides† (p. 1). The barriers, paradoxes, and downsides could lead to abandonment of the servant-leadership ideal when the leader lacking faith fails to see beyond the immediate challenges (Wheatley, 2004). B arriers to the Practice of Servant-Leadership According to Lad and Luechauer (1998) barriers that may offer resistance to the practice of servant-leadership are: 1. Followers might initially consider servant-leadership to be another management fad. Such skepticism arises from the inherent mistrust generated by the times when leaders have not remained faithful to the psychological contracts made with employees who seriously yearn for real change (Reeves, 2002). 2. Leaders and followers may not see servant-leadership as a pressing need, so that leaders remain trapped in a whirlwind of other events and needs that demand urgent attention. 3. Leaders and organizations spend much time and energy on recommending servant-leadership and its many advantages but excuse themselves from practicing it because they see it as not being practicable in their particular organization. Besides, followers may be caught in system relationships that have developed and seem impossible to break (Reeves). Servant-leadership presents two paradoxes: The first emanates from the fact that servant-leadership may take varying and ever changing forms. The leader must be comfortable with such variation in the process and realize the commandment that ‘thou is not the only servant in the organization’ (Lad Luechauer, 1998). Such a realization helps the leader to appreciate the contribution of others to the organization. Without the acknowledgement of other servant-leaders in the organization, servant-leadership can be self defeating. The second flows from the mistaken notion by some followers that servant-leadership implies the absence of rules, hierarchy, or structure, rather than understanding the changes required in the role that rules, hierarchy, and structure perform (Blanchard, 1998). Inhibitors of the Practice of Servant-Leadership Apart from barriers and paradoxes, servant-leadership has its downsides that the leader must be prepared to experience (Lad Luechauer, 1998). Some of the downsides include: 1. The reluctance of some colleagues and followers to collaborate and be empowered. 2. The difficulty of sharing control, of being humble, and capable of uplifting others, and of knowing very well that colleagues may surpass the servant-leader within the organization. 3. The challenges of dealing with anger, frustration, vulnerability, and despondence as the servant-leader strives to be a role model. These, Lad and Luechauer noted, may delay or prevent the process of becoming a servant-leader. But the leader must recognize that these barriers, paradoxes, and downsides are not only perceived but also justifiable. The leader can enhance the possibility of a safe and successful journey into servant-leadership by preparing for such anticipated difficulties early during the leadership mandate. Facing such challenges, the servant-leader should remember that actions speak louder than words and that it is not talking about servant-leadership that does the trick, but practicing servant-leadership style (Lad Luechauer). Strategies for Practicing Servant-Leadership Lad and Luechauer (1998) indicated four ways towards enhancing the practice of servant-leadership: 1. Engagement in dialogue, discussion, education and training, since many of the barriers issue from misconceptions and unrealistic tales about its meaning and practice. 2. Joining or creating the appropriate study groups so as to receive new ideas and encouragement from other servant-leaders. 3. Attendance at Servant-Leadership Conference in order to learn from other participants’ experiences. 4. Engaging in activities such as decorating one’s office with reminders of servant-leadership such as posters, calendars, pictures, daily prayer/meditation/reflection, and maintaining a servant-leadership journal. ) Illustrate how the theory/model illuminates or suggests ideas for practice in one school Schools can become communities in may different forms. They can become: 1. Caring communities: members are motivated by altruistic love and make a total commitment to each other. 2. Learning communities: members are committed to thinking, growing, and inquiring and where learning is for everyone an attitude as well as an activity, a way of life as well as a process. 3. Professional communities: 4. Collegial communities 5. Inclusive communities 6. Inquiring communities Sergiovanni, 1994, P. 71) c) Suggest ways the theory/model might be developed. b. Reflects core educational and moral values of community (exclusivity an issue? ) Core educational values versus moral values of community Moral connections grounded in cultural norms are central to Sergiovannis theory of school leadership. Moral connections come from the duties teachers, parents, and students accept, and the obligations they feel toward others, and toward their work. Obligations result from common commitments to shared values and beliefs, he writes. These moral connections, Sergiovanni believes, must be at the core of building community in schools. Schools that are struggling to become communities should address questions such as: †¢ What can be done to increase the sense of family, neighborliness, and collegiality among the faculty? †¢ How can the faculty become more of a professional community where everyone cares about each other and helps each other to learn and to lead together? †¢ What kinds of school-parent relationships need to be cultivated to include parents in this emerging community?